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Volume I:  Assessment Report 
1.0 Authorization and Notification  
The Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) Technical Discipline Team (TDT) sponsored 
Dr. J. Russell Carpenter, a Navigation and Rendezvous Subject Matter Expert (SME) from 
NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), to provide support to the Defense Advanced 
Research Project Agency (DARPA) Orbital Express (OE) rendezvous and docking flight test that 
was conducted in 2007.  When that DARPA OE mission was completed, Mr. Neil Dennehy, 
NASA Technical Fellow for GN&C, requested Dr. Carpenter document his findings (lessons 
learned) and recommendations for future rendezvous missions resulting from his OE support 
experience. This report captures lessons specifically from anomalies that occurred during one of 
OE’s unmated operations.  It was anticipated the Constellation Program (CxP) Orion Project, 
NASA’s commercial crew and cargo partners, International Space Station (ISS) visiting vehicles, 
and any space vehicles performing rendezvous and docking would benefit from these findings, 
observations, lessons learned, and NESC recommendations.  
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data extracted from Program/Project documents, contractor reports, technical discussions, and 
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inspections. 
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4.0 Executive Summary 
Over the period from late calendar year (CY) 2005 through the middle of CY 2007, the NASA 
Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) Guidance Navigation and Control (GN&C) Technical 
Discipline Team (TDT) member, Dr. J. Russell Carpenter, provided specialized engineering 
technical support to the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) Orbital Express 
(OE) Demonstration System mission.  In particular, Dr. Carpenter served as a member of the OE 
Independent Readiness Review Team (IRRT) that was led by Brigadier General (Retired) Peter 
Worden.
Dr. Carpenter, a NASA civil servant at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), is a 
senior navigation specialist.  He had previously served as the Deputy Chairman on the Mishap 
Investigation Board (MIB) that convened in April 2005 to determine the causes and contributing 
factors relating to the NASA Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART) 
mission.  In that role, Dr. Carpenter provided the necessary program-independent rendezvous 
and navigation engineering expertise needed by the DART MIB.  His NESC-sponsored work as 
a member of the OE IRRT was a logical outgrowth of his DART MIB leadership.   
The OE IRRT was formed in late CY 2005 with the charter to independently identify, assess, and 
advise the DARPA Director (Dr. Tony Tether) on urgent issues that would impact the OE 
mission’s technical success, cost, and schedule.  The IRRT was tasked to focus on developing 
recommendations for pragmatic solutions to issues that would minimize cost and schedule 
impacts, while increasing the probability of accomplishing the OE mission objectives.  
Following the OE launch, the IRRT activity was maintained with an augmented charter which 
included: reviewing the results from on-orbit operations; resolving on-orbit anomalies and 
recommending corrective actions; and providing guidance on the performance of on-orbit test 
scenarios.    
The driving events for this report were a sequence of navigation and sensor problems that 
occurred during one of OE’s unmated operations.  Although OE successfully recovered from 
these anomalies, the DARPA Director suspended further unmated operations, and requested 
Dr. Carpenter to chair a review of the issues that led to these anomalies.  This report captures 
findings, observations, lessons learned, and NESC recommendations that resulted from this 
review, as well as NESC's participation both in the recovery activities themselves, and more 
generally with the IRRT throughout the final 2 years of the OE Project.
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5.0  Problem Description 
5.1 Orbital Express Background 
The purpose of the DARPA OE system was to demonstrate the operational utility, cost 
effectiveness, and technical feasibility of autonomous techniques for on-orbit satellite servicing.
A primary OE objective was to develop and demonstrate an on-orbit autonomous GN&C system 
that would provide the autonomous non-cooperative rendezvous, proximity operations, and 
capture functions and capabilities needed to support on-orbit satellite servicing.
The OE demonstration system consisted of two satellites, launched simultaneously on March 8, 
2007, aboard an Atlas V booster from the Cape Canaveral Air Force Base into a 492-km circular 
orbit at 46-degree inclination.  The satellite that performed the servicing was designated as the 
autonomous space transfer and robotic orbiter (ASTRO).  The next generation 
satellite/commodity spacecraft (NextSat/CSC) functioned as the satellite being serviced by 
ASTRO.  The mission demonstrated autonomous rendezvous, proximity operations, and 
servicing, including transfers of hydrazine fuel, and battery and flight computer orbital 
replacement units.  ASTRO was the active (chaser) vehicle with the NextSat/CSC as the passive 
(target) vehicle.
The block diagram of the OE autonomous GN&C (AGN&C) system is provided in Figure 5.1-1.
As described in Reference 1, the specific key features of the AGN&C system on-board the 
ASTRO spacecraft were: 
1. Fully-autonomous guidance software to perform demate, separation, departure, 
rendezvous, proximity operations, and capture. 
2. Fully-autonomous attitude software to orient the vehicle in required directions during 
each segment of approach and separation. 
3. Onboard guidance sequencer to progress through translation and pointing modes during 
approach and separation. 
4. Functionally-redundant rendezvous sensors to track the target from over 200 km to 
capture. 
5. Fully-autonomous navigation filters to sort and weight data from multiple sensor input 
sources.
6. Internal sanity checks and rendezvous abort capabilities if safety or hazard thresholds 
were exceeded. 
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Figure 5.1-1. OE AGN&C System Block Diagram (from ref.1) 
Many of the OE rendezvous, proximity operations, docking and undocking (RPODU) lessons 
learned reported in this paper were concerned with the suite of navigation sensors employed on 
the ASTRO spacecraft.  Background information on these sensors will assist in understanding 
those sensor-related lessons learned.
The ASTRO spacecraft was equipped with an autonomous rendezvous and capture sensor system 
(ARCSS).  A detailed ARCSS description is provided in Reference 2.  The ARCSS consisted of 
five different sensors, which were mounted on a common optical bench.  The ARCSS consists of 
three imaging sensors:  
1. Narrow field-of-view (NFoV) visible acquisition and tracking sensor, referred to as VS1. 
2. Mid-to short-range side field-of-view (WFoV) visible tracking sensor, referred to as VS2. 
3. Infrared (IR) sensor, referred to as IRS, for use during orbital “night” (eclipse) or periods 
of poor lighting conditions.
In addition to the visible and IR imaging sensors, the ARCSS included a precision laser 
rangefinder (LRF), which was used for mid-range target spacecraft tracking purposes.  Lastly, 
the advanced video guidance sensor (AVGS) laser-based tracking system was employed to 
provide target attitude, range, and bearing during the chaser’s short-range proximity 
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maneuvering and docking operations that occurred in the last few hundred meters of flight down 
the approach corridor.  The AVGS evolved from the video guidance sensor (VGS) technology 
developed by the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in the mid 1990's and flown as a 
flight experiment on the space transportation system (STS)-87 and STS-95 Space Shuttle 
missions.  The AVGS was designed to be an autonomous docking sensor using the same basic 
functional concept as the VGS, but with updated electronics, increased range, reduced mass, and 
improved dynamic tracking capability.  The AVGS had previously flown on the DART 
spacecraft in CY 2005.  
The ARCSS system provided NextSat/CSC target spacecraft state information to the AGN&C 
flight software over a range from a hundred kilometers to close proximity/docking. The ARCSS 
sensors each have a different effective operational range.  Together this sensor suite provided 
overlapping target range coverage as depicted in Figure 5.1-2.
Figure 5.1-2. Effective Operational Ranges of the OE ARCSS (from ref. 2) 
During May and June of 2007 after initial on-orbit system checkouts, the OE spacecraft 
conducted five unmated operations.  The spacecraft conducted one additional long-range 
rendezvous demonstration in July 2007 as part of the decommissioning sequence.
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The ASTRO spacecraft was decommissioned on July 20, 2007.  The Next Sat/CSC spacecraft 
decommissioning occurred on July 21, 2007.  References 3 and 4 discuss post-flight analysis of 
ARCSS and AVGS performance, respectively.  References 5 and 6 provide detailed summaries 
of flight operations. 
5.2 Summary of the Driving OE Event 
During the second OE unmated operation, also known as Scenario 3-1, ASTRO “… was nearly 
crippled [sic] by a major failure in its sensor computer, which processes data gathered by the 
craft’s rendezvous instruments, including cameras, an advanced video guidance sensor and a 
laser rangefinder.”1  With assistance from ground controllers, ASTRO eventually re-mated with 
NextSat.  The contractor, with assistance from a panel of external experts chaired by the NESC 
representative, developed solutions and work-arounds for the problems ASTRO encountered, 
and OE performed its remaining unmated scenarios without significant further issues.
Section 6.0 of this report reviews and summarizes OE’s problems during Scenario 3-1.  
Reference 5 may be consulted for further details.  Section 7.0 captures findings, observations, 
lessons learned, and NESC recommendations that resulted from the NESC's participation both in 
the recovery activities arising from the problems that occurred in Scenario 3-1, and with 
DARPA’s IRRT throughout the final 2 years of the OE Project.  This report serves as an 
expedient means for concisely sharing, with the NASA GN&C community of practice (CoP), the 
engineering knowledge gained from OE's on-orbit spacecraft RPODU flight test experience.  The 
report will be posted to the NASA Engineering Network (NEN) GN&C CoP website for future 
reference (https://nen.nasa.gov/web/gnc).
5.3 Relevance to Future Spaceflight RPODU System Design, Development, 
Test, and Operation Activities 
Space rendezvous subsystem technologies, and the systems engineering to effectively integrate 
them together, will be essential to execute future NASA human and robotic spaceflight missions.  
There will be a continued trend towards designing and developing autonomous rendezvous and 
docking systems to perform routine RPODU flight operations routinely, safely, efficiently, and 
affordably.
In the future, NASA will require GN&C capabilities for space rendezvous and docking to satisfy 
mission requirements for both crewed spacecraft (e.g., CxP Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle 
1 http://www.spaceflightnow.com/news/n0707/04orbitalexpress/, accessed July 5, 2007.  “[N]early crippled” is an 
overstatement; the mission was able to use a backup sensor computer to recover from the anomaly, which was a due 
to a series of failures in the integrated sensor/computer subsystem.  It should be noted that data from these 
subsystems was processed with a set of rules and monitored with respect to preset parameters.  A number of these 
monitors had inappropriate values, and contributed to the series of failures that led to the anomaly.  These issues 
were evident in other unmated operations, but did not have such negative outcomes. 
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(CEV) rendezvous with the ISS in Earth orbit, and CEV rendezvous with the Altair ascent stage 
in Lunar orbit) and robotic spacecraft (e.g., Mars sample return and other targets of scientific 
interest).  In addition, the ISS will continue to host a number of different “visiting vehicles” that 
will have some form of RPODU GN&C interaction.  It will be critical to ISS safety that GN&C 
engineers understand both the nominal RPODU operations and potential RPODU failure modes 
on these visiting vehicles.  Figure 5.3-1 illustrates this wide range of RPODU mission 
applications.  RPODU is also an enabling technology for crewed and robotic satellite servicing 
missions. 
Figure 5.3-1. Some Examples of NASA’s RPODU Mission Applications in Human and Robotic 
Spaceflight
Future RPODU capabilities will require a high degree of system engineering to successfully 
architect and integrate the various sensors, GN&C algorithms, autonomous software, 
mechanisms, actuators, and other subsystems into a spacecraft safely, efficiently, and affordably.
The engineering and economic tradeoffs between manual, automated, supervised autonomy, and 
fully autonomous RPODU systems will need to be investigated for each specific mission 
application.  The use of common hardware and software system elements will need to be 
considered.  Fully integrated RPODU systems, and their multiple spacecraft dynamic 
interactions, will be difficult to test on the ground.  Non-operational space rendezvous and 
docking flight testing opportunities for future RPODU systems should be emphasized, but these 
will likely be limited in number and complexity. 
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Effectively addressing the autonomous RPODU problem will be a significant technical challenge 
involving complex, and sometimes hazardous, dynamic interactions across multiple spaceflight 
regimes.  It should be recognized that DARPA’s RPODU technology and engineering interests 
have significant overlap with NASA activities.  The key point is that the OE Demonstration 
System architecture, concept of operations, and GN&C design (i.e., RPODU sensors, algorithms, 
mechanisms, actuators) flight tested by the DARPA/industry OE team will likely have a strong 
and direct impact on NASA’s future GN&C system design and development activities for 
crewed and robotic spacecraft. It is advantageous for NASA to learn as much as possible from 
the DARPA OE GN&C design, development, and flight test experience.  Capturing and 
disseminating OE lessons learned is an important step and allows NASA to leverage the 
significant DARPA investment in performing the OE orbital flight tests.
6.0 Data Analysis and Review 
This section reviews aspects of OE’s second unmated operation, Scenario 3-1, which are 
germane to NESC’s analyses.  The source of the data presented is Reference 5. 
During Scenario 3-1, ASTRO had been intended to follow a similar profile to that used during its 
first unmated operation, during which it performed a successful in-plane circumnavigation of 
NextSat at an approximate radius of 10 meters.  For Scenario 3-1, separation to 30 m was 
planned to extend the range over which OE's sensors would be demonstrated.  As ASTRO 
returned from its planned maximum separation of 30 m to a 10 m standoff, the aforementioned 
sensor computer failure occurred2.  This failure was the proximate cause of the set of problems 
OE encountered in the operation.  In response, ASTRO executed an abort procedure in which it 
flew through a pre-planned separation corridor, then retreated to a safe-hold station-keeping box 
120 m trailing NextSat.  ARCSS data were lost due to the failure of the sensor computer, but 
AVGS continued tracking throughout the separation corridor.  The trajectory ASTRO followed 
after departing the separation corridor exceeded AVGS visibility constraints, so no relative 
navigation data were available, and relative navigation accuracy began degrading.  Once ARCSS 
was recovered using a backup sensor computer, data from the IR sensor became available as 
ASTRO neared the 120 m station-keep box.  However, the navigation filter began rejecting this 
data, and ground operators elected to place ASTRO into coasting flight mode until the navigation 
problems could be resolved.  While troubleshooting continued, ASTRO drifted without relative 
state measurements over the next day, eventually reaching approximately 2.5 km following 
NextSat, an estimate based on ASTRO's Global Positioning System (GPS) solutions and ground 
tracking of NextSat. 
2 No root cause was identified for the failure of the sensor computer.  Identical software was used for the remainder 
of the mission in a backup sensor computer. 
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At this point, ground operators attempted to arrest ASTRO’s drift rate.  Unfortunately, data from 
ASTRO’s accelerometers was improperly processed by ASTRO’s software, leading to an 
anomalous burn3.  This anomaly corrupted the onboard navigation state, and put ASTRO onto a 
trajectory that repositioned it from 2.5 km following to what was eventually estimated to be 6 km 
ahead of NextSat. 
Over the next several days, ASTRO remained in coasting flight mode, while ground operators 
experimented with various navigation settings to overcome numerous flight conditions that 
significantly differed from pre-flight expectations.  Sensor performance was one area of 
difficulty.  Due to the abort, the geometry of the sun, Earth, and spacecraft were different from 
any configurations contemplated during pre-flight planning. In addition, the sun glare in 
particular was worse than any encountered in pre-flight testing.  The sensors had furthermore not 
been calibrated under such stressful conditions, leading to numerous faulty observations being 
reported to the navigation filter.  The navigation filter itself had never been tested under such 
stressful conditions, and its performance during the recovery phase of the scenario also led to a 
great deal of consternation on the part of the operators.  Unfortunately, many of the sensors 
relied on feedback from the navigation filter for acquisition aiding, so the filter’s poor 
performance interfered with ability of the sensors to facilitate recovery from the abort. 
Eventually, operators found a configuration that would allow data from the IR sensor to be 
accepted by the navigation filter.  Using this data, ASTRO maneuvered to within 2.5 km of 
NextSat, from which point LRF range data could be reliably acquired and processed.  The 
successful processing of the combination of IR and LRF data by the navigation filter allowed an 
approach to 150 m.  The subsequent trajectory was planned to ensure that AVGS data would be 
continuously available.  With the AVGS continuing to meet performance expectations, and 
despite a thermal issue with one of the thrusters that nearly led to another abort, the recovery was 
completed eight days after the operation began. 
Prior to resumption of unmated operations, the DARPA Director requested the NESC to chair a 
review of the navigation and sensor problems OE experienced on Scenario 3-1.  This review 
panel identified a set of liens against a return to unmated operations that the OE team 
successfully addressed.  These liens primarily involved additional on-orbit sensor calibration, 
and navigation filter re-tuning.  The panel identified additional deficiencies in the navigation 
filter design, but did not view correcting these as an imperative for a return to unmated 
operations.  As References 5 and 6 describe, with these adjustments, OE resumed unmated 
operations and completed its mission successfully. 
3 The software fault was associated with a unique untested system configuration that occurred as a result of the 
combination of the sensor computer reset and the type of ground-loaded burn that was used for the drift-stop 
maneuver. 
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7.0  NESC Determinations 
This section describes findings, observations, lessons learned, and NESC recommendations that 
resulted from the NESC’s participation in the recovery activities arising from the problems that 
occurred in Scenario 3-1, and with DARPA’s IRRT throughout the final 2 years of the OE 
Project.
7.1 Findings, Observations, and Lessons Learned 
The following findings are based on facts established during NESC’s involvement with the OE 
Project.
F-1. The autonomous abort to 120 m did not establish an adequately stable and safe 
standoff in the presence of degraded navigation, necessitating additional maneuvers 
that further degraded the navigation state.
As described previously, the original issue that began the series of events leading to the 
contingency during Scenario 3-1 was a re-boot of the computer that hosted the sensor 
processing software.  OE’s flight software, performing as programmed for this 
circumstance, automatically triggered an autonomous abort.  The intent of this abort was 
to place ASTRO at a stable stationkeeping point 120 m following NextSat, at the same 
orbital altitude and inclination.  However, the stability of this type of stationkeeping 
declines as relative navigation accuracy degrades, and the particular contingency that 
initiated the abort had resulted in a loss of onboard relative navigation.  Hence, the abort 
put ASTRO at risk of being unable to autonomously maintain a stable and safe separation 
from NextSat, necessitating additional ground intervention.  With these actions, ground 
operators attempted to increase the margin of safety by allowing ASTRO to drift further 
from NextSat.  As described previously, the drift rate that resulted was high enough to 
cause additional concern, and an attempted drift stop maneuver by ground operators 
triggered a latent defect in ASTRO’s flight software related to accelerometer processing, 
which further degraded relative navigation.  The resulting decline in relative state 
knowledge significantly hampered ground operators’ situational awareness, and impeded 
subsequent recovery operations. 
F-2. The AVGS “spot” (acquisition) mode would likely have provided critical navigation 
measurements when the other sensors were unavailable.  
The AVGS provided range and angular position information, and relative attitude 
information, to about 200 m, when the AVGS retro-reflector targets were in the sensor’s 
field of view.  AVGS is also capable of providing angular position information via its 
“spot” or “acquisition” mode, to about 2 km, based on whatever laser returns are 
available (multiple “spots” are centroided).  This mode was successfully used in the 
DART mission.  OE did not provide proper interfaces to AVGS to make use of the spot 
(acquisition) mode.  Since AVGS was unaffected by the problems occurring with the 
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other relative navigation sensors, its ability to provide angular positions at ranges to 2 km 
would have proved valuable in the recovery from the contingency during Scenario 3-1. 
F-3. The navigation filter underestimated its uncertainty.
All successful rendezvous missions to date, including OE, have used a type of sequential 
navigation filter known as the extended Kalman filter (EKF).  A primary advantage of 
this type of navigation algorithm is that it maintains an online, adaptive estimate of the 
uncertainty in its navigation state estimate.   
In OE’s case, the filter had intentionally been tuned in such a way that it typically 
underestimated this uncertainty (i.e., the filter was always “over-confident” about how 
well it was navigating).  The rationale given for this tuning was that it was required for 
adequate performance in long-range rendezvous scenarios.  Although pre-flight 
simulations had indicated this issue to a smaller degree, in-flight experience showed that 
the OE navigation filter often underestimated its uncertainty by an order of magnitude or 
more.  Due to OE Project resource limitations, it was not deemed possible to make the 
types of changes to the filter that would have been required to remedy this issue.  There 
were multiple consequences of this design, several of which are described in other section 
of this report.
The most fundamental consequence, improper weighting of sensor data, is the focus of 
this finding.  One way to understand how the EKF uses its uncertainty estimates is by 
analogy to the methods historically used by sailors.  A shipboard navigator maintains a 
track log that is updated regularly by a combination of dead reckoning and making fixes.  
A fix consists of observing a celestial object or a known landmark with an instrument that 
measures some component of the ship’s position.  In between fixes, the navigator dead 
reckons the ship’s position by extrapolating from the previous fix using an estimate of the 
ship’s speed and heading.  When updating the track with a new fix, the navigator judges 
the accuracy of the fix against the accuracy of the dead reckoning, accounting for 
uncertainty in tides and currents, compass errors, helm errors, etc., and makes an 
adjustment to the track log.   
There are no fundamental differences between the shipboard navigation described and the 
functioning of the EKF.  If the EKF inaccurately estimates its uncertainty, then it will not 
be able to adequately “judge” how best to combine new observations from the sensors 
with its previously “dead reckoned” extrapolation track.  If the EKF consistently 
overstates the accuracy of its estimates, then it will tend to undervalue the information 
provided by new sensor data, and get increasingly “locked in” to a track based on ever-
older information. 
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F-4. Pre-flight testing did not reveal the sensor and navigation issues that occurred in 
flight.
The OE Project determined it was infeasible for the spacecraft sensor suite and 
navigation software to be tested in a fully integrated, hardware-in-the-loop fashion.
Further, the facility used for testing the navigation cameras was unable to simulate the 
dynamic range and diversity of optical effects that might be expected to occur in space4.
Although it is not possible to say definitively that such pre-flight testing would 
unequivocally have discovered the issues with the sensors, the navigation filter, and their 
interactions that led to the contingency during Scenario 3-1, such testing “as you fly” 
may have helped to detect them prior to flight. There was a Government facility available 
that could have assisted with this type of testing, which the OE Project elected not to 
utilize. 
F-5. Pre-flight navigation system stress testing did not account for extreme sensor data 
outliers.
The OE team performed a significant amount of software simulation prior to the mission, 
much of which included random noise and bias-like output perturbations to reasonably 
high-fidelity sensor models.  However, the noise models generally assumed “well-
behaved” statistics (i.e., the distribution of the noise was assumed to be Gaussian).   
In flight, due to a variety of problems with the sensors, their outputs were different from 
what had been simulated.  The laser range finder would occasionally report extreme 
outliers several kilometers out of family from the rest of its measurements, and the 
cameras often reported false targets resulting from misidentification of optical artifacts.
In effect, the sensor data that occurred in flight had a higher probability of occurring far 
from their mean values than the Gaussian distribution was capable of producing.
Subsequent consultation with the laser vendor revealed that the outliers were an expected 
feature of the sensor’s design. 
F-6. Testing of ground uplink abort commands did not reveal the issues that occurred in 
flight.
Late in the development program, the OE team added a capability to uplink ground 
initiated abort commands.  Because these were not initially contemplated, the manner in 
which they had to be introduced required a re-initialization of the navigation filter.  
Critical to the anomaly that occurred in Scenario 3-1 is that some of the states in the 
navigation filter tracked the accumulated biases in the inertial measurement unit’s 
accelerometers.  When the filter was reset, so were these states, which corrupted their 
4 It is not clear that any existing facility can accurately model the full range of optical effects that occur in space. 
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estimate of the accelerometer bias.  The navigation system could quickly recover from 
this condition, so long as a burn did not begin at the same time.  However, if a burn did 
initiate concurrently, the system would try to correct the error in the navigation filter’s 
accelerometer bias state, which in flight was large immediately after a reset.  
In flight, this resulted in a larger than intended abort maneuver, which was also 
improperly directed.  The difference between the flight occurrence of this issue and when 
this capability was tested on the ground pre-flight was the duration of the time that had 
elapsed prior to the reset.  The reason the time elapsed was important was that over a 
short interval, the accelerometer bias does not accumulate to a large enough value to 
affect the burn. 
F-7. There was no consistently available and accurate backup to OE’s onboard 
navigation system.
Soon after OE lost its onboard navigation knowledge during Scenario 3-1, the ground 
operators realized that ground orbit determination solutions based on ranging data from 
the Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN) stations would not be accurate enough 
to support recovery operations.  As this eventuality had been contemplated prior to 
launch, OE had prior arrangements with the AFSCN imaging radar site operators to 
provide contingency support if needed.  Unfortunately, due to maintenance at one of 
these facilities, the amount of tracking from these sites was limited.  In addition, AFSCN 
were unable to provide a full state orbit determination solution.  Nevertheless, the range 
estimates and other data the AFSCN provided proved to be invaluable in supporting the 
recovery from the contingency. 
The following observations are factors, events, or circumstances that the NESC team identified 
which did not contribute directly to the problems occurring during Scenario 3-1, but nonetheless, 
have the potential to cause or increase the severity of similar problems for future RPODU 
activities. 
O-1. Final approach along the radius and velocity vectors tended to cause unanticipated 
thruster duty cycles and subsequent over-heating.
As is typical for most rendezvous missions, during the final meters of the ASTRO’s 
approach to NextSat, ASTRO would fly through a conical corridor extending along 
NextSat’s docking axis.  This trajectory segment would in general not correspond to any 
natural, coasting orbital motion, and hence would require more frequent thruster firings to 
maintain than had the rest of the rendezvous and proximity operations profile.   
Depending on the objectives of the current operation, sometimes NextSat would remain 
sun pointing during the approach, and sometimes NextSat would point along either its 
velocity or radius vectors.  In the latter two cases, somewhat more frequent effort was 
required to fight against orbital mechanics to remain inside the corridor.   
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The thruster firing logic design was such that when small and frequent maneuvers were 
commanded, unexpected chattering would occur when the commanded thrust was larger 
than the minimum thruster firing allowed by the logic.  In such cases, the subset of 
thrusters (usually only one) bearing the brunt of the duty cycle would approach its 
operating temperature limit.  Consequently, during the last moments of the recovery from 
the Scenario 3-1 abort, one thruster was within a few degrees of reaching its temperature 
limit and thus triggering an abort.   
O-2. The process of dumping the onboard recorders and extracting the data from the 
downlinked files proved cumbersome during contingencies.
Real-time telemetry was stored by ground operators and was readily available for post-
processing and fact-finding during the trouble-shooting surrounding anomalies.  
However, the full telemetry set was only available during AFSCN contacts, and the 
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) coverage was not continuous, so that 
gaps existed in the real-time telemetry record.  All of the data were stored in OE’s 
onboard recorders, but retrieving this data proved difficult.  First, dumping the recorders 
required re-configuring the telemetry, which was not always feasible or advisable, due to 
other demands occurring during the anomaly (e.g., commanding and downlinking of 
situational awareness imagery).  More significantly, once the data was downlinked, the 
process of extracting the guidance and relative navigation data occurred slower than real-
time.  These limitations conspired with the high tempo of contingency operations to 
effectively prevent the ground team from being able to make use of the data from the 
onboard recorders during trouble-shooting surrounding anomalies. 
O-3. Possible evidence of ASTRO absolute position radial biasing.
During the recovery from the Scenario 3-1 contingency, analysis of the real-time 
telemetry indicated the possible existence of radial biases in ASTRO’s absolute position.
Since no “truth” trajectory was available for comparison, this evidence was inconclusive.  
What was observed was that the differences between ASTRO’s GPS receiver’s position 
point solutions and the navigation filter’s estimate of ASTRO’s absolute position were 
biased by approximately 10 to 15 m when no other data were being processed by the 
navigation filter.  Once the filter began to ingest data from the IR camera, the bias 
appeared to increase to approximately 20 to 30 m.  The large number of gaps and a strong 
time-varying signature present in the data make these conclusions on the bias somewhat 
speculative.  Nevertheless, it remains plausible that at OE’s altitude of approximately 
500 km, ionospheric biasing of the GPS measurements could have been present. 
O-4. Spacecraft collision was possibly prevented by the unintentional presence of out of 
plane motion.
When OE lost all navigation information during Scenario 3-1, ASTRO unintentionally 
passed from one side of NextSat to the other without real-time knowledge of ground 
operators.  Although onboard navigation was not available during this time frame, later 
analysis of less accurate ground-based orbit determination solutions suggested that the  
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in-plane projection of ASTRO’s motion might have passed within 10 m or less of 
NextSat in the process of switching sides.  Prior to this, as a consequence of an improper 
ground-initiated abort maneuver, several dozen meters of out of plane motion had 
unintentionally been introduced into ASTRO’s orbit relative to NextSat.  The ground-
based solutions suggest that, thanks to this unintentional out of plane maneuver, at the 
time when ASTRO’s in-plane motion was close to NextSat, it probably had a reasonably 
safe out-of-plane separation. 
O-5. The navigation filter’s model of how NextSat’s orbit propagated during sensor 
outages introduced significant relative state errors.
The navigation filter modeled NextSat’s orbit using a gravity model that only included 
central-body and equatorial oblateness terms.  No atmospheric drag, solar radiation 
pressure, third-body gravity, or other perturbations were modeled.  When relative 
measurements were available, pre-flight analysis had shown this model to be adequate for 
OE’s mission.  However, such a model can be expected to introduce errors on the order 
of 10 to 20 km per day [ref. 7]5, depending primarily on the atmospheric density.  Since 
ASTRO’s orbit was constantly updated with GPS, this propagation error would directly 
contribute to errors in the relative state, when relative measurements were not available. 
Although such outages of relative measurements were never intended to occur, the 
contingency during Scenario 3-1 led to more than a day without any direct measurements 
of the relative state.  In this circumstance, the OE ground team had to rely on infrequent 
updates by various ground tracking assets to maintain safe separations between the 
vehicles with ground-commanded thruster firings. 
O-6. The navigation filter’s relative state estimate was biased after long periods of angles-
only tracking.
During the unmated scenarios that extended beyond a few kilometers, it was typical that 
the only data type available to the navigation filter was angular position information, 
primarily from the IR camera.  In these cases, the filter had to rely on a combination of 
fairly inaccurate target state propagation, and correlations between angular observables 
and actual range.  Such correlations become evident to the navigation filter as relative 
motion normal to the line-of-sight to the target occurs.  The biasing problem was clear to 
the OE ground operators, who could often observe laser rangefinder measurements that 
were a kilometer or more different from the navigation filter’s range estimate.  At times, 
the ground operators had to restart the filter to enable it to ingest the laser rangefinder 
measurements, which operators had come to realize were indicating a more accurate 
representation of the true range.  Such filter restarts had the potential to interfere with 
previously planned maneuvers. 
5 The example quoted is for a low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite (LACE) at solar maximum, that used a higher-fidelity 
model than OE’s navigation filter used. 
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The following lessons learned summarize the knowledge or understanding that the Automated 
Rendezvous and Docking (AR&D) CoP has gained from the OE experience. 
LL-1. System designers and operators should be mindful of implicit assumptions 
concerning the availability of a navigation state.  
There were times during the recovery from the abort during Scenario 3-1 in which there 
was significant confusion among OE’s ground operators concerning ASTRO’s position 
relative to NextSat.  After the anomalous drift stop maneuver, extended time was 
required to establish a coarse characterization as to whether ASTRO was leading or 
following NextSat.  Once the recovery was underway and accurate navigation knowledge 
was restored, a member of the OE operations team, who had also been one of the 
principal system designers, made the off-hand comment that “Nav is really important”.   
This comment succinctly summarized a lesson that the OE team appear to have learned 
from their OE mission experience.  These individuals gained a heightened appreciation of 
the degree to which at least some coarse knowledge of the navigation state may be taken 
for granted.  Although NASA’s AR&D CoP includes navigation experts, such expertise 
can sometimes be compartmentalized, and even experienced experts can take situational 
awareness for granted.  More generally, most people have never been caught at sea in a 
fog, or found themselves alone at the controls of an aircraft in instrument meteorological 
conditions, and hence have never truly experienced what it is like to lose the usual cues 
that lead to situational awareness.  Such experiences reinforce that navigation should 
never be taken for granted.  The OE operations team did have this experience when OE 
lost navigation information during the aforementioned contingency.   
LL-2. IR sensors can enhance system robustness to unanticipated lighting variations.
Prior to the abort in Scenario 3-1, many members of the OE team appeared to view the IR 
sensor as a secondary or supplemental sensor.  The lesson learned was that because the 
IR sensor was less susceptible to unanticipated variations in lighting conditions, it 
provided a robust and capable alternative to sensors operating in the visible light band.
Although the OE IR camera was not without its problems (primarily associated with 
calibration; this topic is discussed further in the recommendations), it was the primary 
sensor through which the mission accomplished its recovery from the contingency.  
Furthermore, it was the sensor that most reliably tracked during a majority of the 
operations that occurred outside of AVGS range. 
LL-3. A coupling between sensor and navigation software is susceptible to mutually 
reinforcing problems.
The software controlling the OE sensor suite and the navigation filter software were 
tightly coupled in a number of ways that led to some of the problems that occurred during 
Scenario 3-1.  This interdependence caused precipitous system performance degradation 
as the subsystem performance declined. The lesson learned was that tight coupling might 
reduce overall system robustness, since problems may mutually and negatively reinforce 
each other. 
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The navigation filter aided the sensor software with a target ephemeris message, and the 
sensor software aided the navigation filter with measurement validity information.  This 
coupling, when it occurred in the presence of spurious sensor measurements, led to a 
feedback that prevented OE from recovering its navigation state, even when ground 
operators could see via downlink imagery that NextSat was in the sensors’ fields of view. 
The feedback began when optical artifacts (e.g., glints, glares, saturations, hot pixels) 
appeared in the sensors’ fields of view.  Due to faulty target selection logic, these were at 
times reported as target tracks.  The navigation filter would ingest these measurements, 
which resulted in biasing its state estimate, while at the same time decreasing the filter’s 
state uncertainty.  The improper reduction in uncertainty occurred because the filter 
“believed” these were valid measurements on the basis of the measurement validity 
information from the sensor software.  The filter would begin reporting biased target 
ephemerides to the sensor software, which prevented the sensor software from 
subsequently associating the image of NextSat with a successful target track. 
Another example was that some of the relative navigation sensors needed a range 
estimate seed to set operating parameters when acquiring NextSat.  In some cases, this 
seed was to have been provided by other relative navigation sensors.  When these other 
sensors had either spurious or no measurements, the range-estimate seed was not 
provided, which prevented acquisition with other sensors.  In some cases, this 
significantly reduced the number of sensors operating at the same time.  
LL-4. To achieve an effective sensor calibration on-orbit, the target vehicle should not be 
present in the sensors’ fields of view, and possible sources of image corruption 
should be included.
Prior to commencing unmated operations, OE performed two sets of on-orbit sensor 
calibrations.  Pre-flight calibration had been performed in a contractor facility prior to 
launch integration.  However, the facility was unable to simulate the dynamic range and 
diversity of optical effects that might be expected to occur in space.  The on-orbit 
calibrations consisted of demating ASTRO and NextSat using the robotic arm, moving 
NextSat while remaining on the arm, performing the calibration, and then remating.  
NextSat remained in the sensors’ fields of view during this procedure, and other bright 
objects (e.g., the Earth limb and the moon) were excluded from the fields of view.
This calibration procedure failed to reveal the optical artifacts that contributed to the loss 
of navigation during Scenario 3-1.  Prior to initiating further unmated operations, the 
calibration procedure was repeated, but with the change that NextSat was moved out of 
the sensor field of view, and bright objects were imaged.  This proved to be a more 
effective calibration procedure.  The data from this calibration, in combination with the 
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data previously gathered during the aborted Scenario 3-1, allowed the OE ground team to 
retune the sensor software to remove a majority of the optical artifacts. 
LL-5. Situational awareness imagery can be critically important in aiding the ground 
operations team’s recovery from an abort, and since ground-based assets provide 
limited coverage, providing such data via the TDRSS should be a system capability.
As originally configured, OE was only capable of downlinking situational awareness 
imagery from its cameras via the AFSCN.  In general, the AFSCN contacts were shorter 
and sparser than TDRSS contacts, but the TDRSS contacts had a lower bandwidth.
Despite the limited bandwidth of the TDRSS link, the OE team was able to reconfigure 
the telemetry during the contingency so that limited situational awareness imagery could 
be downlinked continuously during TDRSS contacts.  This imagery was crucial to 
ground decision-making during the recovery operation.  Unfortunately, at critical times, 
the availability of such telemetry to engineering support areas outside of the operations 
center was sometimes limited. 
LL-6. The navigation filter must be able to identify and screen out erroneous sensor data 
without affecting the filter’s processing of valid sensor data.
This capability depends on the filter’s accuracy in modeling the time-evolution of the 
navigation state vector, predicting the sensor measurements, and computing the statistics 
of the states and measurements.  As mentioned previously, successful rendezvous 
missions to date, including OE, have used the EKF.  A known attribute of such filters is 
that “… large values of the prediction residual relative to the prediction standard 
deviation may be an indication of bad tracking data and hence may be used to edit data 
from the solution” [ref. 8]6.  The efficacy of such editing is hindered when the filter does 
not accurately compute the aforementioned residual standard deviation.  In OE’s case, the 
filter typically underestimated the residual standard deviation.  For the reasons previously 
mentioned, the core of this issue was not addressed, but the mission was flown first 
without editing, and later with unusually large editing thresholds (i.e., roughly 
corresponding to ten or more standard deviations).  When editing was disabled, the filter 
ingested spurious measurements that ultimately led to a total loss of onboard state 
knowledge.  When editing was enabled with the large thresholds, filter performance also 
suffered, and periods of filter divergence sometimes occurred. 
7.2 NESC Recommendations 
The following recommendations were identified from the NESC’s findings, observations, and 
lessons learned.  They are directed towards the development of future non-human rated RPODU 
missions7.
6 The residual is the difference between the observed and expected measurement. 
7 Reference 11 offers detailed recommendations concerning RPODU for piloted spacecraft based on Space Shuttle 
Program experiences. 
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R-1. Consider ground operators’ role in real-time reaction to autonomous aborts.
The overall success of OE’s RPODU operations is attributable to provisions in OE’s 
design that allowed ground operators to fully control the recovery from contingencies.  
The OE design avoided limitations that precluded ground intervention.  In general, OE 
limited autonomous contingency responses to those cases when it was not practical for 
ground operators to intervene in a timeframe consistent with the mission’s operational 
tempo.  OE’s operators could generally over-ride any autonomous abort response.  Future 
missions should allow and encourage involvement from ground operators during aborts 
in similar fashion where feasible.  Additionally, to avoid the problems OE experienced in 
Scenario 3-1, future RPODU missions should, where feasible, adopt the following 
strategies. 
a. Design autonomous contingency responses to rapidly place the vehicles into a 
stable, safe, coasting flight configuration. 
This will allow the ground sufficient time to recover the mission, without unduly 
stressing the ground operations tempo.  Although OE used such a strategy in Scenario 
3-1 after the abort to 120 m proved unsustainable, it was a ground-commanded 
fallback action, not an autonomous response. 
b. Perform pre-flight systems engineering design activities that plan scenarios of 
how ground operators will interact with mission elements both onboard and on 
the ground to accommodate anomalies.
Such activities typically do not occur until pre-flight mission simulations and operator 
training exercises.  Performing these activities during system design can identify 
design issues. 
R-2. Plan for the generation of independently derived “best-estimated” trajectories 
(BET’s).
Although true absolute and relative trajectories of RPODU missions can never be 
accurately known, it is generally possible to derive a post facto “best-estimate” of the full 
set of relevant trajectory parameters by combining available data in an estimation 
process.  Cost and schedule constraints may drive missions not to implement a robust 
capability in this area.  Due to a number of factors and circumstances previously 
described, OE’s ability to provide such data were limited.  These limitations detracted 
from the assessment of OE’s readiness for resumption of unmated operations.  To avoid 
such problems, future RPODU missions should, where feasible, plan for the following 
activities. 
a. Derive BET’s using a combination of onboard- and ground-based sensor data. 
b. Validate navigation subsystems by comparison to BET’s. 
c. Assess performance of navigation subsystems by comparison to BET’s. 
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d. Provide for the availability of BET’s within a timeframe consistent with 
supporting investigations associated with mishaps and recoveries from 
contingencies.
R-3. Seek to design sensor suites so that they perform their functions as independently 
from each other as possible. 
Because OE was designed with a navigation sensor suite that had a diversity of data 
types, and dissimilarly redundant components, it was able to recover from the 
unanticipated issues that led to the abort in Scenario 3-1.  However, coupling between the 
sensors and the navigation filter allowed problems occurring in different sensors to 
negatively reinforce each other. 
R-4. Consider off-nominal conditions when planning sensor calibrations. 
Many of the issues that led to OE’s difficulties in Scenario 3-1 centered on sensor 
calibration issues that became evident during the ensuing off-nominal conditions.  The 
following summarize how calibration practices OE adopted during its anomaly recovery 
could be applied in future RPODU missions. 
a. Calibrate sensors on-orbit, with and without targets in the field of view, during 
at least the initial mission checkout phase. 
b. Calibrate sensors on-orbit under all possible lighting conditions that might 
reasonably encountered, including off-nominal conditions that might occur due 
to contingencies. 
c. Calibrate sensors on-ground and on-orbit over their full range of specifications 
(e.g., expected range, relative attitude, field-of-view, and dynamics), and over a 
sufficient dynamic range to cover off-nominal lighting conditions (e.g., bloom 
and glint). 
R-5. Apply appropriate fidelity to pre-flight simulation and testing. 
As previously described, OE performed a significant amount of high-fidelity pre-flight 
testing, yet problems still occurred that were not discovered during testing.  To better 
mitigate such risks, future RPODU missions should attempt to incorporate the following 
guidelines for pre-flight testing. 
a. Complete high-fidelity integrated simulations of GN&C algorithms using 
realistic mission profiles, which model the range of variation expected in the 
spaceflight environment, prior to the final implementation of the algorithms as 
flight software. 
This allows the opportunity for modification of the algorithms based on discoveries 
from the integrated simulations.  If instead the flight software design has already been 
largely completed when such issues are discovered, then it becomes difficult to make 
significant changes.  Cost and schedule pressure can result in less-than-ideal solutions 
to such problems. 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report 
Document #: 
NESC-RP-
10-00628
Version: 
1.0
Title:
Orbital Express Rendezvous Lessons Learned 
Page #: 
26 of 32 
NESC Request No.: 10-00628 
b. Consult with sensor and actuator vendors to ensure that simulations model 
performance effects that might reasonably be expected to occur.   
Special attention should be given to discovering and modeling outliers, biases, non-
Gaussian noise characteristics, and other output features that might differ from 
GN&C system designers’ expectations. 
c. Derive performance estimates based on integrated GN&C simulations from 
statistically significant sets of simulation runs, and include confidence intervals 
or similar measures based on the data set size. 
d. Validate software-only GN&C simulations using closed-loop feedback from 
hardware-in-the-loop emulators. 
e. Conduct hardware-in-the-loop testing of the sensors, software, and actuators to 
verify the closed loop response of system interactions, and the overall system 
timing and latency.
Such tests should include stress cases, control mode transitions, and flight- or flight-
like processors. 
f. Perform pre-flight testing with durations representative of flight operations in 
an effort to identify unanticipated failure modes that may only develop after 
such time intervals have elapsed. 
R-6. Consider anomaly resolution when deriving telemetry bandwidth and coverage 
requirements.
a. Consider anomaly characterization and resolution in the system design of the 
telemetry bandwidth and coverage. 
b. Design the onboard recorder with sufficient data downlink and archival 
capabilities to provide timely support for anomaly investigation. 
c. Ensure adequate bandwidth between ground facilities to retrieve anomaly data. 
R-7. Provide capabilities for ground operators’ situational awareness in system design.
a. Design diverse communications paths to deliver critical flight data to ground 
operators.   
Where feasible, including TDRS in the system design can facilitate optimized 
situational awareness and data gathering.
b. Include compressed low-resolution optical imagery as presented to optical 
sensors in the communications downlink.
c. If a separate situational awareness camera is used, then it should be mounted on 
the same navigation bench as the optical sensors. 
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R-8. When using AVGS or derivative sensors, fully utilize all capabilities of the system. 
a. Employ “spot mode” so as to receive bearing information when outside the 
range at which AVGS can provide a full set of range, bearing, and relative 
attitude measurements. 
b. Ensure that range seeds sent to the sensor have adequate precision. 
R-9. Include propulsion system constraints (e.g., temperature limits) in pre-flight 
analysis of non-coasting flight segments (e.g., the corridor approach used by OE). 
R-10. Implement robust strategies to ensure timely and effective communications 
concerning program status across program elements during all operational phases, 
including contingency response activities. 
R-11. Employ rendezvous navigation algorithms of sufficient fidelity to allow for the 
propagation of the target vehicle’s orbit over longer intervals than nominally 
planned.
This allows for support of contingency operations, since during such operations, the time 
over which such propagations may occur without any relative sensor updates may 
significantly exceed nominal expectations. 
R-12. Abort strategies should accommodate the loss or degradation of onboard 
navigation.
An example of such a strategy is to avoid introducing relative motion that re-intersects 
with the target vehicle’s orbit track (V-bar) at any point in subsequent orbits.  Such a 
strategy is effective because small errors in relative orbit period arising from loss of 
navigation can result in such intersections violating close approach criteria.  This strategy 
would also minimize the sensitivity of the abort to problems occurring from feedback 
control of the orbit that depends on accurate relative navigation data (e.g., such as 
ASTRO used for station-keeping 120 m following NextSat).   
R-13. Provide a robust method for ensuring timely availability of sufficiently accurate 
target vehicle orbit state information.   
Possible sources of information include: GPS on the target vehicle and a chaser-target 
communications link to relay the GPS data; wide field-of-view, long-range sensors that 
do not rely on precise pointing information to acquire the target (e.g., a rendezvous radar; 
ground-based relative orbit solutions based on sufficiently accurate ground-based 
tracking and/or TDRSS tracking); and a wide field-of-view transponder or beacon on the 
target vehicle. 
R-14. Utilize best practices for rendezvous navigation filter design. 
a. Maintain an accurate representation of the target-chaser relative state 
estimation errors, including an accurate variance-covariance matrix. 
This allows the filter to compute an appropriate gain matrix.  It also aids the filter in 
appropriately editing unsuitable measurements. 
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b. Provide a capability for measurement underweighting that adapts to the current 
uncertainty in the filter’s state estimation error, as required to be consistent with 
the suboptimality of the navigation filter’s measurement update.
Effective means for accomplishing this have been found to include:
i. Modified second-order Gaussian state update method [ref. 9];  
ii. Multiplicative adjustment of the mapping of the state error covariance matrix 
into the measurement subspace, which occurs within the computation of the 
residual covariance [ref. 12]; and
iii. Schmidt-Kalman state update [ref. 10] that utilizes the covariance matrix of 
“consider” parameters (i.e., states that the filter does not update, but for which 
it maintains a covariance).   
Multiplicative adjustment of the measurement noise covariance matrix within the 
computation of the residual covariance (the “bump up R” method [ref. 10]) has been 
found to be less effective, and is not recommended unless other methods are not 
feasible. 
c. Estimate states that model biases in sensor measurements and account for un-
modeled accelerations. 
Gauss-Markov models for these biases have been found to be more effective than 
random constant or random walk models.  Random constant models can become 
stale, and random walk models can overflow during long periods without 
measurement updates. 
d. Provide commands that allow for selective processing of individual measurement 
types.   
If the filter utilizes an automated residual edit process, then the recommended 
command capability should be able to override the residual edit test.
e. Maintain a backup ephemeris, unaltered by measurement updates since 
initialization, which can be used to restart the filter without uplink of a new state 
vector. 
f. Provide a capability for reinitializing the covariance matrix without altering the 
current state estimate. 
g. Ensure tuning parameters are uplinkable to the spacecraft, and capable of being 
introduced to the filter without loss of onboard navigation data. 
h. Provide flexibility to take advantage of sensors and sensor suites’ full capability 
over all operating ranges. 
R-15. Seek independent review by discipline expertise throughout the project life cycle. 
a. Proactively seek the advice and recommendations of independent rendezvous 
experts with experience in developing and operating rendezvous missions. 
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b. Maintain independent rendezvous expertise continuity throughout the project 
life cycle, particularly but not only at key milestone reviews. 
c. Engage independent rendezvous experts in the development of post-mission 
analysis studies and lessons learned activities. 
R-16. Use caution with angles-only rendezvous. 
a. Weigh the risks of angles-only rendezvous techniques against the cost of 
mitigating the constraints that preclude the use of active sensors. 
b. Study and incorporate lessons learned from the flight history of relevant 
missions. 
Some occurrences of angles-only rendezvous include the following:  radar-fail cases on Gemini 
X, XI, and XII, STS-92, and some Soyuz missions; mishaps on Progress-Mir, Engineering Test 
Satellite (ETS)-VII, and DART; and during difficulties experienced by OE and Experimental 
Satellite System (XSS)-11.   Reference 13 provides information on many of these missions. 
Reference 14 addresses the Gemini rendezvous experiences in particular. A summary of the 
Japanese ETS-VII rendezvous and docking technology in-space experiment results is given in 
Reference 15. The publically released overview of the DART mishap investigation results is 
provided in Reference 16. Lastly, Reference 17 describes how the XSS-11 mission demonstrated 
capabilities and technologies for autonomous rendezvous and proximity operations.  
R-17. Plan for post-mortem. 
a. Archive detailed post-flight analyses of rendezvous and proximity operations. 
A partial list of such activities includes: archival of flight data, both real-time 
telemetry and data from onboard recorders; determination of actual performance by 
comparison of flight data to post-facto best-estimated parameters; comparisons 
between predicted and actual performance; and archival and documentation of results 
in form and content suitable for varying levels of disclosure consistent with 
applicable laws, rules, and guidelines.
b. Plan to ensure data archives are readily available to support resolution of 
contingencies during operations. 
8.0 Alternate Viewpoints 
There were no alternate viewpoints expressed during this assessment. 
9.0 Other Deliverables 
There were no other deliverables for this assessment. 
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10.0 Acronyms List 
AGN&C Autonomous Guidance, Navigation and Control 
AR&D  Automated Rendezvous and Docking 
ARCSS Autonomous Rendezvous and Capture Sensor System  
ASTRO Autonomous Space Transfer and Robotic Orbiter  
AVGS  Advanced Video Guidance Sensor  
CEV  Crew Exploration Vehicle 
CoP  Community of Practice 
CY  Calendar Year  
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Project Agency  
DART  Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology 
EKF  Extended Kalman Filter  
GN&C  Guidance, Navigation and Control 
GSFC  Goddard Space Flight Center 
IR  Infrared  
IRRT  Independent Readiness Review Team  
ISS  International Space Station 
LRF  Laser Rangefinder 
MIB  Mishap Investigation Board 
MSFC  Marshall Space Flight Center 
NEN  NASA Engineering Network 
Next/CSC Next Generation Satellite/Commodity Spacecraft  
NFoV  Narrow field-of-view  
OE  Orbital Express 
RPODU Rendezvous, Proximity Operations, Docking & Undocking  
TDT  Technical Disciple Team 
VGS  Video Guidance Sensor  
WFoV  Wide Field-of-View 
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